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Abstract  In the economic domain often people have to make decisions by taking into account the perceived 
intentions of the partners. The aim of this study was to test how the perception that the responder is lying affects 
proposers’ offers in the Ultimatum Game. Twenty undergraduates took part to the experiment by playing the role of 
proposers. They were matched with responders who could be sincere or lying. Participants’ eye movements while 
watching the partners presenting themselves were recorded and their decision style (intuitive vs. deliberative) was 
assessed through the PID scale. It emerged that proposers offered less money to partners who were perceived as 
deceiving. Visual strategies during the inspection of the partner varied according to his/her perceived truthfulness. 
Decision style modulated both money offers and eye-movement patterns. The study supports the notion that lie 
detection is crucial in economic decisions involving the interaction with other people and that visual behaviors, as 
well as stylistic differences, play a mediating role. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the theory of rational choice, people 
should have coherent and self-interested preferences based 
on the assessment of the consequences of each possible 
choice of action. Yet, numerous studies have confirmed 
that individuals do not always act according to these 
assumptions and choices often are neither coherent nor 
self-interested. Some studies, for example, have shown 
that the choice is influenced by the representation of the 
advantage rather than the advantage itself [1]. In addition, 
Kahneman and Tversky [2] showed how important is, for 
determining the choice, the mere linguistic presentation of 
the positive or negative consequences of the different 
options. A decision anomaly, therefore, could be explained 
by the fact that people have different representations of the 
same dilemma of choice. 
Anomalies of such a kind occur in economic games as 
the Ultimatum Game task [3]. In this classical economic 
game, participant A (proposer) has a certain amount of 
money to share with participant B (responder). B can 
either accept A’s proposal for splitting the money between 
them or refuse it. If B accepts, the division becomes 
effective, otherwise both participants do not get anything. 
According to the theory of rational choice, B should 
accept any proposal by A, following the assumption that 
any sum of money is better than nothing. However, often 
participants’ choices are influenced by the perception of 
unevenness, which is despised. Hence B usually turns 
down any offer that is less than half of the initial amount. 
Within this framework, Kenning e Plassmann [4] 
described human behavior according to two systems: 
intuition and reasoning. These two systems operate 
together, balancing their contribution according to 
different tasks or settings. In a similar perspective, Sanfey 
and colleagues [5] distinguished between automatic and 
controlled processes. The first ones con not be consciously 
controlled by individuals and depend more on emotions 
and subjective variables such as motivation, attitudes, 
personality traits and thinking biases. Even though the two 
systems operate in every person, some people tend to rely 
more on either the first or the second system. The concept 
of “style” has been proposed to conceptualize this kind of 
individual differences. Styles concern the preferred 
strategies, which are relatively stable over time and across 
situations, of cognitive organization and functioning, as 
these emerge in perceiving, memorizing, learning, judging 
and solving problems [6]. The existence of stylistic 
differences has been proved in the specific field of 
decision making, where the dichotomy between intuitive-
automatic and rational-controlled styles has been 
repeatedly proposed [7]. People characterized by the first 
style prefer to make decisions through a slow process, 
which implies a systematic, elaborated and logical 
evaluation of alternatives. People characterized by the 
second style, on the contrary, tend to decide through a fast, 
effortless and automatic process, which is usually based 
on hunches and feelings. 
By referring to the Ultimatum Game, it is likely that 
players’ choices are driven mainly by the first system, 
since the second one, relying on rational-utilitarian criteria, 
would lead proposers to split money selfishly and 
responders to accept any offer. If proposers behave fairly, 
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they are influenced by an intuitive sense of justice and 
modulate their offers according to the impressions 
provided by the partners; responders, on the other hand, 
reject unfair offers because of their immediate emotional 
reactions to the violation of such a moral sense. In order to 
explain decision anomalies in the Ultimatum Game, some 
authors referred to the theory of reciprocity [8]. According 
to the theory, people reward kind and punish unkind 
actions. Kindness regards both the intention and the 
consequences of an action. The same consequences of an 
action are perceived and reciprocated in a different way 
depending on the intention that guides the action. Thus, 
the way the players perceive the partners - an aspect of 
mindreading - is critical in determining their decisions in 
the Ultimatum Game [9].  
An interesting and yet not investigated aspect of 
mindreading in the Ultimatum Game is the individuals’ 
ability to detect lies in their partners. Lying is something 
constantly present in the course of life and it is easy to 
hypothesise that this may have an effect on everyday 
interactions. For instance, numerous studies showed that 
during conversation people make use of statements which 
are somehow misleading [10]. Although individuals tend 
to believe that other people are constantly telling the truth, 
every person intimately knows that this does not happen in 
all cases. Therefore, our decisions, which are based on 
information which we get from the surrounding context, is 
influenced not only by a general perception of others but 
also by our belief on what they are saying. For this reason 
exploring more deeply the link between decision making 
and lying (intended as an important interpersonal and 
emotive variable in everyday interaction) is relevant. 
We lie for various reasons, from the most trivial to the 
most important ones [11]. Many theorists [12,13] argued 
that the reason for lying is somehow linked to survival of 
human species: actually, facing scarcity of resources, men 
have always lied to get what they needed. Like many other 
behaviours that were maintained over time for this reason, 
lying has now a different meaning. People do not lie only 
to gain resources needed for survival, but also, for 
example, to obtain desired but unnecessary goods, to look 
better, to deceive others, to protect those they care about 
and so on [14,15,16].  
Lying is different from other similar concepts for three 
fundamental characteristics: the falsity of the content, 
which is communicated in a linguistic or extra-linguistic 
way; the knowledge of such falsity; the intent to deceive 
the recipient [17,18]. As far as the last characteristic is 
concerned, cognitive planning process is essential in lie. 
To better understand why people lie, it is important to 
distinguish between low-risk and high-risk lies, which 
represent, respectively, the two poles of a continuum. The 
first type can be defined as “a daily-life lie”, which is said 
during the easy conversation and is not particularly 
relevant on the interpersonal level. It requires a limited 
cognitive effort in terms of planning and communication 
and it is characterized by a low concern about the 
possibility of being caught. A high-risk lie, on the other 
hand, involves serious consequences (in terms of costs, 
but also benefits) for both the liar and the partner. In this 
case, lying is a complex cognitive function, since it 
requires the activation of several different high functions, 
such as inhibitory control, working memory and advanced 
cognitive planning [19-25]. 
A model, particularly relevant to the present study, 
which integrates the requirements of these cognitive skills 
is the activation-decision-construct model (ADCM) 
developed by Walczyk and collaborators [21]. ADCM is a 
cognitive-based theory of deception that has three 
components. The first component is the activation of 
information, which requires working memory to manage 
the activated memories and knowledge of the truth. This is 
followed by the decision-making component, in which the 
choice to tell either the truth or a lie requires inhibition to 
suppress critical details related to the truth when a lie is 
said. Finally, the construction component, in which a 
plausible alternative to the truth is constructed, requires 
attention. However, when the speaker’s intention is to 
respond honestly, only the activation component is 
required, suggesting an increased planning time 
requirement to tell a lie compared with the truth [21]. 
In general people, presumably because they are aware 
of how many resources are required to tell a lie, 
overestimate their ability to unmask those who lie [26]. 
However, many studies showed that humans are modest 
debunkers of the lies of others. Among the different 
human groups there are certain categories of people who 
have proven to be more adept at uncover lying clues, such 
as delinquents [27], spies and clinical psychologists [28]. 
The reason why human beings have, in general, limited 
powers to spot lies is related primarily to the lack of 
certain and universal clues to detect lies. The second 
reason for this difficulty is related to the extreme 
heterogeneity of registers and styles of communication 
used in lying. Thirdly, people develop stereotypical 
“theories” on clues that help to detect lies, which are not 
based on empirical evidence, and can easily lead to errors 
of judgment. Fourthly, it should be noted that the basic 
social conventions tend not to lead to suspicious attitude. 
Doubting everything and constantly accusing others of 
falsehoods prevents establishing any relationship of 
intimacy and trust [26]. Lying is thus an important 
interpersonal phenomenon that serves the purpose of 
regulating social life [29]. 
The present study was designed to investigate how lies 
affect decision-making processes in the economic domain. 
We used the Ultimatum Game task to test our main 
hypothesis that economic decisions are affected by the 
perception of lies. The effects of lying were investigated 
not only through direct behavioural and self-report 
measures, but also implicit indexes derived by the use of 
eye-tracking technologies. More in detail, the following 
hypotheses were formulated.  
1. Because of the influence of mindreading process in 
the Ultimatum Game, when an individual believes that 
his/her partner is lying, this can rise negative attitudes 
towards him/her and affect how this individual will 
calibrate his/her choices, which will be aimed in some 
way at disadvantaging and hinder the insincere partner. 
Hence, we expected that in the Ultimatum Game detecting 
the lie leads the proposer to give a less fair offer to the 
responder. 
2. Knowing that the partner may lie should lead 
individuals to use different visual strategies to process the 
non-verbal communication of the other player. It was 
expected that, while looking videos showing a lying 
partner, players focus more on hands (as reliable 
indicators of the tension produced by the intention to 
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deceive), but while watching true presentations attention 
would be directed mainly to the face. 
3. We also hypothesized that individual decision-
making style affects: 
3a. Players’ visual behaviors: it was expected that 
intuitive people are mostly attracted by the face and 
rational people by the hands in their visual exploration of 
the partner. The former ones should try to make the most 
of the our main non-verbal mean of communication (the 
face) because it can provide an overall impression of the 
partner’s intentions; the latter ones should try to build 
their judgment on the part of the body (the hands) which 
conveys a set of cues about the tension-relaxation state of 
the partner from which it can figured out if he/she is lying. 
3b. The decision-making strategies used during the 
Ultimatum Game Task: intuitive decision-makers, because 
of their higher skill in detecting lies (see 3c), should be 
more affected by mindreading, and hence offer less money 
to lying responders. 
3c. Their ability in detecting lies: intuitive individuals 
should base their representations on the non-verbal 
hunches provided by the interlocutor, without analysing 
thoroughly the truthfulness of the message received (an 
operation which is not possible with time constraints as 
those imposed in our experiment). 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Instruments 
2.1.1. Decision-Making Task 
The Ultimatum Game task was employed. Participants 
played the role of proposer in 4 consecutive runs. In each 
run they were matched to a different, unknown responder, 
who was presented to them through a video. Responders 
were 4 people who volunteered to present themselves and 
having their presentations recorded. We chose 2 men and 
2 women. Within each couple of responders, one person 
was close to the participants’ age, whereas the other one 
was older. The responders presented themselves following 
the same schema in providing information (see Table 1 for 
details). Information to be provided in the presentation 
was derived from personal knowledge that proved to be 
influential in the Ultimatum Game to modulate players’ 
behaviour according to their perception of the partner’s 
intentions [30]. We asked each responder to provide two 
versions of his/her presentation, focusing on the same 
topics, but once they had to say the truth, the other one 
they had to lie. Topics (see Table 1) have been defined by 
the researchers. The truth version corresponded to 
responder’s real life, the false one was a plausible one. 
Each false version was proposed by responders and then 
discussed with researchers in order to guarantee 
homogeneity within the different presentations. None of 
the responders were professional actors, in order to have 
more spontaneous behaviours. We asked responders to 
wear simple clothes with neutral colours. Each video 
featured the responder’s steady close-up. All the videos 
had approximately the same length. 
Table 1. Summary of Information about the Responder Provided to Participants in the Video Presentations 
Responder: ALEX (age 21) 
 TRUE FALSE 
Occupation Student and waiter Drop out from school, he helps his father in his hardware store 
Interest Writing Politics and reality shows 
Personal value Flexibility and independence He believes in institutions 
Family 
He teaches rugby to children. He is very attached to 
his family. His dream is to write a book. He believes 
that fantasy can help to live a better life. 
His mother is a doctor. He has a younger brother who gets the most attention. 
He relieves his trust in government that, according to him, reflects the 
interests of most families. 
Responder: ELIJAH (age 46) 
 TRUE FALSE 
Occupation Probation officer Chef 
Interest Sports He likes travelling 
Personal value Determination Ambition and hard work 
Family 
He is the eldest son. Married for 15 years. 
Introverted and stubborn. He is not interested in 
politics and do not believes in institutions. 
It owns a restaurant on Lake Garda; he had to make many sacrifices, but he 
loves his job because it is creative. He lives with his girlfriend and they have 
a 7-year-old daughter. 
Responder: ESTHER (age 25) 
 TRUE FALSE 
Occupation Student Clerk and bartender 
Interest Chess Having fun and meeting people 
Personal value She believes in family She never compromises 
Family 
She has a 6-month-old daughter with a former 
teacher with whom she lives. She is not wealthy but 
she is happy because she has everything she needs. 
She is dating a new guy. She likes moving and she hopes to move to Rome in 
the coming future. She is determined and stubborn. 
Responder: ARMANDA (age 54) 
 TRUE FALSE 
Occupation Employee Florist 
Interest Politics ad traveling Photography 
Personal value Fairness, equality and justice She believes that children of different nationality should have separate school courses 
Family She has two grown sons. She was the first mayor woman of her town. 
Her husband is laid off. She has no children but she always took care of her 
niece. She would like to make a trip to the US. 
After shooting the videos, each of them was examined 
by three psychologists (not aware of the research aims and 
not informed about which videos were true or false), who 
were asked to observe them looking for signals of 
deceptions. Judges were provided with an observation 
form where some indexes were listed. The indexes, 
derived from the literature [26,31,32], were: smiles, head 
movements, eye movements, pauses, voice pitch, eyelids 
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beats. Judges were asked to rate each index as revealing 
either a sincere or lying responder’s attitude. Significant 
differences in ratings between true and false presentations 
emerged in all judges’ reports, thus supporting the notion 
that videos included cues from which the participants 
could infer the partner’s intention (that is, telling the truth 
or lying). 
In each run the participant had to decide how to split 
100 euros with the responder. Responders’ feedbacks were 
revealed at the end of the 4 runs. It was set that the 
responders accepted fair (50:50) and rejected unfair offers 
(participants were unaware of this criterion). One out of 
the 4 responders was randomly selected at the end of the 
game and the 10% of the pay-off of the corresponding run 
was given to the participant (thus, a participant gained 5 
euros if he/she split money fairly with the extracted 
responder, nothing if he/she split money unfairly). 
2.1.2. Eye-Movement Recording 
While playing the Ultimatum Game, participants’ eye 
movements were recorded using an eye-tracking (ET) 
system. This tool, using infrared technology, allows 
investigators to record eye movements made by a 
participant in front of a monitor that shows a video or an 
image. We used a Tobii x-120 eye-tracker and analysed 
data by means of the Tobii Studio software. This system 
allows a rapid and automatic calibration procedure for 
each participant. Tolerance of large head movements 
allows participants to move freely and naturally in front of 
the stimulus. If the subject moves out of range, the ET 
system resumes almost instantly when he/she comes back 
into range. The unobtrusive technology creates a 
distraction-free test environment, ensuring the natural 
behaviour of subjects and valid research data.  Advanced 
drift compensation maintains high accuracy and precision 
under varying light conditions. Robust ET capability 
ensures very low data losses, regardless of the 
participant’s ethnic background, age, use of glasses, 
contact lenses or mascara. 
The qualitative output provided by ET is represented by 
clustered images related to the most intensely fixated areas 
of the stimuli. Quantitative data return specific measures 
linked to number and lengths of fixations and observations. 
These indexes were considered with reference to two 
specific parts of the stimuli (called “areas of interest”: 
AOI): the face and the hands of the responder. The 
indexes considered in our study were: time passing before 
the first fixation (TBFF: the time in seconds from when 
the stimulus was shown until the start of the first fixation 
within an AOI ), first fixation duration (FFD), fixation 
length (FL: the length of the fixations in seconds within an 
AOI), fixations count (FC: the number of fixations within 
an AOI), observation length (OL: the total time in seconds 
for every time a person has looked within an AOI, starting 
with a fixation within the AOI and ending with a fixation 
outside the AOI) and observations count (OC: The 
number of visits and re-visits to an AOI). These data are 
useful to see if people use different visual strategies when 
trying to detect lies, focusing more on those non-verbal 
indexes that are associated with lies. 
2.1.3. Assessment of the Decision-Making Style 
The Preference for Intuition-Deliberation scale (PID) 
[33,34] was administered to identify the preferred decision 
style. PID includes two subscales of 9 items each: one 
measures the tendency for intuition (PID-I) and the other 
one for the deliberation (PID-D). Examples of items on 
the two subscales are: 
- “Before making decisions I first think them through” 
(PID- D). 
- “I listen carefully to my deepest feelings” (PID-I). 
Participants express their degree of agreement with 
each statement on a scale with five possible responses, 
with 1 corresponding to complete disagreement and 5 
corresponding to complete agreement. 
Factorial analysis confirmed the two-subscale structure 
and their time stability (r = .59 for PID-D and r = .76 for 
PID-I after two weeks; r = .74 for PID-D and r = .76 for 
PID-I after 6 months). The psychometric properties of PID 
were confirmed for the Italian version of the instrument 
[35]. The PID appears to be a reliable instrument to assess 
stylistic differences in decision making [36]. 
Since the decision-making style has not to be intended 
as dichotomy, we computed the scores for the two 
subscales and then assigned participants to three groups: 
intuitive (participants falling in the two highest quartiles 
in the distribution of scores in the PID-I subscale), 
deliberative (two highest quartiles in the PID-D subscale) 
and balanced (two lowest quartiles in the PID-I and PID-D 
subscales). 
2.2. Sample and Procedure 
Twenty university students (15 girls and 5 boys, aged 
between 22 and 25 years) took part to the study. They 
attended different faculties. They had never played the 
Ultimatum Game before and they did not attend courses 
concerning both decision making nor economic 
psychology and behavioural economics. They received no 
course credit nor were paid for participation, except the 5-
euro gain which they possibly obtained according to how 
they split money with the extracted responder. 
The experiment took place in a quiet laboratory room. 
Participants were tested individually in a session of about 
30 min. The first part of the session was carried out in 
front of a computer screen. Firstly the equipment to record 
eye movements was installed and calibrated. The rules of 
the Ultimatum Game were explained. In each run of the 
game the participant firstly watched the video where the 
responder presented him/herself. Participants knew that 
their partners in the game might be lying when presenting 
themselves. Afterwards the participant decided how the 
sum of 100 euros had to be split between him/herself and 
the partner. Participants gave their responses aloud and the 
experimenter recorded them. Finally the participant was 
asked to rate responder’s truthfulness on a dichotomy 
scale (“he/she is lying” - “he/she was telling the truth”). 
Each participant was exposed to two true and to two 
false videos. The combinations of responders (Alex, Elijah, 
Esther, Armanda) and conditions (true, false) was 
designed so that each responder was presented in the true 
and false conditions the same number of times. The order 
of presentation of the responders and of the conditions 
was counterbalances in the whole sample so to control 
possible order and sequence effects. 
Before leaving the room, participants were asked to fill 
in the PID questionnaire in a paper-and-pencil format. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Lie Detection 
As far as the participants’ responses concerning the 
truthfulness of the presentations, it was found that 
proposers tended to regard their partners in the Ultimatum 
Game as sincere. This was true of Alex, Elijah and Esther. 
The opposite was true of Armanda (Table 2). In any case, 
when the responder presented him/herself in a false way, 
the percentage of the response “Is telling the truth” 
decreased. Such a trend emerged with all responders. 
Analysing the accuracy of lie detection according to the 
decision style, it was found that intuitive participants 
provided a higher percentage of correct answers (58.33%) 
as compared to the deliberative ones (41.67%), but this 
difference was not statistically significant (p > .05). 
Table 2. Percentages of Participant’s Responses Concerning the Truthfulness of the Partners 
 Alex Elijah Esther Armanda 
 “Is lying” “Is telling the truth” “Is lying” “Is telling the truth” “Is lying” “Is telling the truth” “Is lying” 
“Is telling the 
truth” 
True Video 20 80 30 70 10 90 70 30 
False video 40 60 40 60 30 70 80 20 
3.2. Effects of Lying on Decision Making 
The means of the sums of money offered to each 
responder by the participants under the sincere and lying 
conditions were computed. The mean amount of money 
given to the responders was not different by comparing 
actually true and false presentations. However, by 
considering the true/false distinction as based on the 
participants’ perceptions (namely, by computing the mean 
offers given to the responders when they were perceived, 
respectively, as being sincere or lying) differences 
emerged. Participants offered less to every responder 
when they believed that the partner was lying and this was 
especially true when they were faced to female responders 
(Table 3). 
Taking into account the decision-making style, a link 
was found between this individual difference and the offer 
to Armanda when she was perceived as lying (F(2,9) = 7.92, 
p < .05): deliberative decision-makers offered much more 
(M = 61.67 euros, SD = 10.4) than intuitive (M = 31.00 
euros, SD = 13.4) and balanced (M = 20.00 euros, SD = 
14.0) decision-makers. In all other cases (for each 
responder and condition) balanced participants tended to 
offer more than the other subsamples. 
Table 3. Amount of Money (in Euros) Proposed to the Responders 
Depending on Truth Judgments 
Character Judgment M (SD) t19 
Armanda “Is telling the truth” 48.00 (17.89) 2.19 p < .05 “Is lying” 26.00 (14.42) 
Esther “Is telling the truth” 46.25 (21.87) 2.38 p < .05 “Is lying” 31.25 (6.29) 
Elijah “Is telling the truth” 47.33 (19.17) 0.35 p > .05 “Is lying” 47.00 (16.43) 
Alex “Is telling the truth” 35.00 (15.06) 0.30 p > .05 “Is lying” 32.50 (20.92) 
 
Figure 1. Mean Values of the TBFF Index (AOI = Face) for Each Responder under the True vs. False Conditions 
3.3. Visual Behaviour 
We tried to highlight possible effects depending on the 
responders, the condition (true vs. false video) and their 
interaction on the participants’ visual behaviour while 
watching the partners’ presentations. Running a repeated-
measured ANOVA, the significant main effect of 
responder emerged (F1.04, 18.67 = 4.53, p < .05, η2 = .32) on 
the TBFF index related to the AOI of face. As it clearly 
detectable from Figure 1, the effect concerns mainly 
Video 1 (Alex) in Condition 1 (False) where the highest 
value (M = 41.46, SD = 60.89), compared to the other 
responders, was recorded. This effect can be due to the 
very first information given by Alex in the false condition 
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(being a school drop-out working with his father): it is 
possible that participants focused first on the general 
environment to search for evidence of this statement, 
which could be confirmed by a more scruffy environment. 
Considering the FL index concerning the AOI of face, a 
significant main effect of the responder emerged (F3, 54 = 
29.45, p < .001, η2 = .67). Comparing the simple effects of 
the different responders, we found significant differences 
between Armanda’s presentations compared to all other 
ones (vs. Alex: p < .001; vs. Elijah: p < .001; vs. Esther: p 
< .001), but also between Alex and Esther (p < .001) and 
between Elijah and Esther (p < .001). As can be seen in 
Figure 2, Video 1 (Alex) and 3 (Elijah) obtained low 
scores, whereas Armanda (Video 2) had the highest. 
Analysing the index FL related to AOI of hands, we 
observed a different trend, with a significant interaction 
effect of responder and condition (F3, 54 = 3.06, p < .05, η2 
= .28). Considering the simple effects, particularly 
relevant is the video of Esther, for which there was a 
significant difference if compared to Elijah (p < .05) and a 
significant change from a condition to the other one: while 
looking at false presentations, participants tended to focus 
more on the hands than on the face (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. Mean Values of the FL Index (AOI = Face) for Each Responder under the True vs. False Conditions 
 
Figure 3. Mean Values of the FL Index (AOI = Hands) for Each Responder under the True versus False Conditions 
Taking into account the FFD index related to the AOI 
of face, the main significant effect of the responder (F3, 54 
= 3.10, p < .05, η 2 = .29) and the significant interaction of 
video and condition (F3, 54 = 2.89, p < .05, η2 = .27) 
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emerged. Considering the simple effects, the two more 
interesting presentations were those of Alex and Armanda. 
Alex’s one turned out to be extremely different almost 
from all the other presentations (vs. Armanda: p < .05; vs. 
Elijah: p = .07; vs. Esther: p < .05), showing that 
participants, while looking at this presentations, focussed 
less, when starting their visual exploration, on his face, 
compared to what they tended to do while looking at other 
presentations (Figure 4). Yet, this data could be explained 
also by a greater richness of contextual elements in this 
specific presentation. The video of Armanda is also 
particularly interesting as it showed the largest gap 
between the first and the second condition. In the truthful 
presentation, in fact, there was a greater duration of the 
first fixation of her face. Adding to this data those derived 
from the FL indexes related to AOI of hands, we can 
derive a clear trend: in the truthful presentation people 
tended to focus more on the face, whereas they directed 
their attention on hands while looking at the false one. 
 
Figure 4. Mean Values of the FFD Index (AOI = Face) for Each Responder under the True vs. False Conditions 
 
Figure 5. Mean Values of the FFD Index (AOI = Hands) for Each Responder under the True vs. False Conditions 
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Although no significant data emerged regarding the 
FFD index on the AOI of hands, it is worthwhile to note a 
general trend in visual behaviour regarding this index. It is 
possible to notice that Alex’s and Elijah’s videos on the 
one side and Esther’s and Armanda’s videos on the other 
one varied in the same direction: for the first two 
responders the higher value of this index occurred in the 
second condition than the first one; for the latter 
responders, on the other hand, the higher value occurred in 
the first condition (Figure 5). 
Some interesting results were found in relation to the 
decision-making style. Deliberative decision-makers 
explored the face later (TBFF: M = 18:13, SD = 27.73), 
whereas the balanced ones took less time to focus their 
attention onto the face (TBFF: M = 10.97, SD = 22.00), 
but only with male responders. When faced to the 
women’s presentations, instead, intuitive and balanced 
participants were much slower (TBFF: M = 14.35, SD = 
19.05), compared to the deliberative ones (TBFF: M = 
2.90, SD = 6.59), in focusing their attention onto the 
partners’ hands. It was also possible to note that, with 
regard to indexes such as FC and OL, intuitive 
participants were more focused on faces whereas balanced 
individuals had higher values in such indexes for the AOI 
of hands (Table 4). 
Table 4. Mean (SD in Parentheses) Values of Attention Focussing 
Indexes by Intuitive and Balanced Decision-Makers 
Visual behaviour 
index AOI Intuitive Balanced 
FC Face 38.85 (28.49) 24.92 (19.74) Hands 0.54 (0.87) 1.33 (1.94) 
OL Face 40.35 (8.11) 27.44 (16.50) Hands 0.21 (0.37) 0.49 (0.70) 
Participants’ visual behaviour differed also when they 
were looking at videos believing that the responder was 
telling the truth or was lying, but this happened only when 
proposers were looking at older responders’ presentations. 
Considering Elijah, differences emerged when participants 
were looking at his false presentation: those who believed 
him to be truthful observed more his face than those who 
believed he was lying (Table 5). As far as Armanda is 
concerned, differences emerged as well only when 
examining her false presentation: people who believed her 
to be telling lies focused on her hands (Table 5). 
Table 5. Participants’ Visual Behaviour According to the Responder’s Perceived Truthfulness 
Elijah (False presentation) - AOI = face 
OL M (SD) t9  
“He is lying” 14.47 (9.43) -2.88 p < .05 “He is telling the truth” 42.56 (2.41) 
Armanda (False presentation) - AOI = hands 
FFD M (SD) t9  
“She is lying” 0.16 (0.17) 2.52 p < .05 “She is telling the truth” 0.00 
FC 
“She is lying” 0.71 (0.70) 2.50 p < .05 
“She is telling the truth” 0.00 
4. Discussion 
The first interesting finding of this study is related to 
the evaluation of truth. Participants tended to perceive 
information provided by their partners in the Ultimatum 
Game as truthful. The only remarkable exceptions 
concerned the two videos of Armanda. This woman was 
always considered false by most participants. Actually, if 
we consider the percentages of truth evaluation without 
the ratings on Armanda’s videos, the percentages are even 
more impressive: 75% judged the information as true and 
only 25% as false. This finding is coherent with the 
literature, which suggests that people are poor at detecting 
lies. A meta-analysis of 206 studies showed an average hit 
rate of 54%, which is surprising given that chance 
performance is 50% [37]. The exception constituted by 
Armanda can be explained considering that she was the 
female character far from our sample mean age, and hence 
participants could have perceived her as more distant, 
tending to judge her as liar. This interpretation can be 
supported considering that the other female character 
(Esther), who was close to our sample’s age range, was 
mostly described as sincere. Hence, young adults could 
tend to believe that their peers are sincere because lying to 
a peer is perceived as more stressful and as a more severe 
moral infraction [38]. Another possible explanation makes 
reference to Armanda’s personal characteristics: she 
tended to speak very quickly, moving her hands and she 
was cold and unemotional, so showing indicators that 
people associate to lying [32]. Given the general tendency 
to trust their partners, it is worth noting, however, that our 
participants were rather able to discriminate when 
responders were lying, since the percentages of the 
response “Is telling the truth” decreased when proposers 
were faced to false videos. 
Comparing individuals’ responses according to their 
decision-making style, it appeared that intuitive persons 
gave more accurate judgments. This could be explained 
referring to the task itself, which required a very quick 
evaluations (each video was less than 2 minutes long) and 
answers: intuitive people may had been advantaged by this 
requirements. Actually, when tasks cannot be performed 
through analysis, when they are complex and time 
pressure is high, intuition may be the more advantageous 
decision style [39,40]. 
The second finding is that proposer’s behaviour is 
affected by his/her perception of the partner and that the 
effect is modulated by stylistic differences. In fact, the 
sum of money offered to the responders depended on the 
judgement of veracity and the decision-making style. 
Considering the opinions about truthfulness, people 
tended to offer less when they believed that the responders 
were lying and this was particularly true when the partners 
were women. This result, along with the highest difference 
in offer found when Esther (young woman) was perceived 
as a liar, could be explained referring to our peculiar 
sample, composed mostly by women and keeping in mind 
that a lie told by a peer is considered as a more sever 
moral infraction [38]. 
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Decision-making style had a strong influence in relation 
to the false video of Armanda, in response to which 
deliberative individuals offered much more than the other 
ones. This may be due to the fact that information 
provided was more complex than in other videos and 
analytic people tended to trust more this format, which 
was perceived as closer to their own way of thinking. In 
all other situations, balanced participants tended to 
propose higher amounts to the partners. This can be 
explained hypothesising that intuitive persons were 
advantaged in this task and tended to calibrate better their 
offers, resulting in lower offers; on the other hand, the 
deliberative style was found to be positively correlated 
with basic beliefs [41] and such beliefs can lead people to 
be more conservative in offering money to people who 
could be lying. 
Participants’ visual behaviour differed when they were 
looking at true and false videos and when believing that 
the partners were telling the truth or were lying, but this 
happened only when looking at older respondents’ 
presentations. It was probably easier for our sample to 
hypothesise that an older person was lying to them. When 
exploring a video believing that the character was telling 
the truth, people focused more on his/her face, probably 
trying to confirm their conjectures. This is explained by 
the fact that people are more attracted to this area of the 
body when they are listening to a person and this is 
especially true while they are evaluating, with a positive 
attitude, the truthfulness of what they are told [42]. The 
opposite behaviour might occur when people are looking 
at a partner who they do not suppose to be honest. 
By analysing eye movements we highlighted interesting 
patterns of visual behaviour. Among the 12 indexes 
considered (6 for the AOI of face and 6 for the AOI of 
hands), most of them showed significant differences 
among videos or video X condition interaction effects. 
Participants’ visual behaviour changed in different 
conditions. It was actually possible to describe a strong 
general trend: while watching false presentations, 
participants were more focused on the hands rather than 
on the face, whereas the opposite was true of sincere 
responders. It seems, therefore, that people, when suspect 
that their partner is lying, focus on hands’ movement, 
probably to look for signs of nervousness, whereas they 
pay more attention to the face when they presume to 
receive true information, and this is coherent with 
previous results [32].  
Examining participants’ visual behaviour also 
highlighted some differences based on individual style. 
Deliberative decision-makers tend to focus more on hands; 
in contrast, intuitive individuals are more interested in 
exploring faces. This is especially true for intuitive 
decision-makers when looking at men’s presentation and 
for deliberative persons when looking at women’s 
presentations. 
5. Conclusions 
This pilot study allowed us to confirm almost all the 
initial hypotheses and it was also possible to explore more 
deeply some issues. Our first hypothesis - according to 
which people, when facing a lying player, would tend to 
lower their offer - was confirmed, mostly with female 
partners. This finding, however, needs to be explored 
more, maybe using a sample balanced by gender. 
The second hypothesis, on the other hand, was fully 
confirmed: data highlighted that participants applied 
different visual strategies when exploring different videos 
and differences were due to believing the respondents 
were lying or telling the truth. 
Decision-making style affected visual behaviour, thus 
confirming hypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3b was only 
partially confirmed. According to the hypothesis, when 
faced with Armanda, intuitive participants gave her less 
money than deliberative participants. In all other cases the 
balanced individuals offered more, whereas no significant 
differences emerged between deliberative and intuitive 
decision-makers. It is likely that, whereas deliberative 
persons tend to be more thoughtful, intuitive ones are 
more able to detect lies (see hypothesis 3c), and hence 
offer less money to the liars. Hypothesis 3c was also 
confirmed: intuitive participants gave more accurate 
responses in the lie-detection task, even if the difference 
was not statistically significant.  
In conclusion, the study supported the notion that lie 
detection is crucial in economic decisions involving the 
interaction with other people and that visual behavior, as 
well as stylistic differences, plays a mediating role. 
However, though the reported results appear to be 
promising and add a few relevant information about the 
role of visual behaviour in the Ultimatum Game, different 
aspects of the study should be investigated involving a 
larger sample of participants which allows investigators to 
test the possible effects of participants’ gender. 
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